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Significant resources and efforts have been devoted, especially in the U.S.A., to develop 
predictive policing programs. Predictive policing is, at the same time, one of the drivers of the birth, 
and the ultimate material enactment of, the anticipatory logics that are central to the smart city 
discourse. Quite surprisingly, however, critical analyses of the smart city have remained divorced 
from critical criminology and police studies. To fill this gap, this article sets out the first critical, in-
depth empirical discussion of Blue CRUSH, a predictive policing program developed in Memphis 
(TN, U.S.A.), where its implementation intersects long-term austerity for urban policy. The article, 
first, shows that there is no evidence of Blue CRUSH’s capacity to prevent crime, thus adding 
empirical material to skepticism over the role of predictive policing as a policy solution in the first 
place. And, second, it argues that, rather than making crime a matter of technological solutions, 
predictive policing shifts the politics therein—in short, it contributes to the expansion of policing 
into the field of urban policy at the same time as it disrupts present police work. These takeaways 










Introduction: from smart city to predictive policing 
 
This article discusses the intersection between a governmental discourse, the smart city, and a 
governmental practice, predictive policing, that is, “the application of statistical methods to identify 
likely targets for police intervention (the predictions) to prevent crimes or solve past crimes, 
followed by conducting interventions against those targets” (Hunt, Saunders & Hollywood, 2014, p. 
iii; emphases in the original). Predictive policing, which works with the same anticipatory logics 
that have been shown to be crucial to the smart city discourse (White, 2016), is particularly relevant 
to explore and further unpack these very logics: in general, because crime control and prevention 
are interconnected with virtually every domain of urban policy, thus working as a synecdoche for 
urban policy more generally (cf. Garland, 2001; Tulumello, 2018b); and, in particular, because 
predictive policing makes the clash between technical “solutions” and the political nature of social 
“problems” (cf. Gusfield, 1981) particularly evident, allowing for a critical discussion of the 
rationale of technical neutrality of the smart city discourse. 
Joh (2019) has recently argued that policing is “inherent” to the smart city: as cities become 
smarter, the practice of policing is embedded within the socio-technical infrastructure of the city. 
And yet, scant empirically-grounded conversation exists among, on the one hand, critiques of the 
smart city and its governance (found above all in urban studies and human geography), and, on the 
other, critiques of predictive policing (found above all in criminology, police studies and 
journalistic inquiry). The goal of this article is contributing to filling this gap by focusing on the 
traits d’union between the smart city discourse and predictive policing. In historical perspective, the 
two concepts emerged more or less at the same time during the second half of the 2000s: in 2008, 
IBM CEO Sam Palmisano gave his “smarter planet” speech at the Council on Foreign Relations; 
the same company had been working on Blue CRUSH, pioneer program of predictive policing, in 
Memphis since 2006, but would only start to consider crime detection and prevention a core 
business a few years later (cf. McNeill, 2015). In a nutshell, the development of predictive policing 
has been part and parcel of the birth of the smart city, at least as far as one of the key global actors 
thereof is concerned. Indeed, the genealogy of both concepts is very much the same: that of 
longstanding attempts at making the city object of rational thinking, data calculation and control—
see Townsend (2015) on cycles of urban science and Mattern (2015) on the history of the urban 
dashboard. 
In substantive terms, two dimensions, which we are going to explore in this article, are common 
to the logics of the two concepts: the focus on anticipating and managing the future as a way to 
address present problems (cf. Anderson, 2010); and the conceptualization of urban problems as a 
matter of technological and technocratic solutions. 
We present the first critical, in-depth study of Blue CRUSH (Crime Reduction Utilizing 
Statistical History), a predictive policing program developed by the Memphis Police Department 
(hereafter MPD) in cooperation with the University of Memphis and two corporations (IBM and 
local company SkyCop). We then discuss Blue CRUSH in light of the peculiar, though ordinary, 
policy and political context of Memphis, a city that we will show to be particularly interesting to 
cast light on the intersection between crime control, neoliberal governmentalities and long-term 
urban austerity (cf. Tulumello, 2018a). The discussion of Blue CRUSH will allow us to provide two 
main contributions: we will show that there is no evidence of Blue CRUSH’s capacity to prevent 
crime, thus adding empirical material to existing skepticism over the role of predictive policing as a 
policy solution in the first place; and we will argue that, rather than making crime a matter of 
technological solutions, predictive policing shifts the politics therein—in short, it contributes to the 
expansion of policing in the field of urban policy at the same time as it disrupts police work. These 
takeaways on predictive policing, we conclude, are crucial to further the critique of the promises of 
the smart city discourse. 
Before moving to the discussion of Blue CRUSH, in the next two sections we review the critical 
literature on the smart city and on predictive policing to emphasize the common focus, respectively 
discursive and practical, on the future; and raise the specific research questions that will guide the 




Our reconstruction of the case is based on a six-months period of research carried out in 
Memphis during a visiting period spent by Author 1 at the University of Memphis, Department of 
City and Regional Planning in 2016, that is, a few years after the period of maximum (political and 
economic) investment into Blue CRUSH (2006-2011). As we will see below, the fact that, during 
following years, a reducing number of sworn officials made it impossible to maintain Blue CRUSH 
into full operativity was considered by some of our informants to have reverted what they 
considered a positive trend in crime during 2006-2011. By making fieldwork in 2016, then, we were 
able to place both policy and crime trends in a longer context: with regard to policy, we could 
explore the long-term impacts of Blue CRUSH in the restructuring of urban policy; and, with regard 
to crime, we compared trends “before”, “during” and “after” the full implementation of Blue 
CRUSH (cf. Table 1). Our broad epistemological strategy is case study research, making use of 
qualitative mixed methods. Our main sources of evidence are: crime data from the FBI Uniform 
Crime Reporting (UCR)1 plus other provided by MPD—further details are in section “On 
effectiveness”; documental analysis—policy documents, municipal decisions, institutional websites; 
in-depth qualitative interviews and work meetings with policymakers and experts, including some 
key actors in the development of Blue CRUSH;2 and field notes from participant observation in the 
neighborhood of Klondike-Smokey City,3 and participation to “town-hall” meetings organized by 
the municipality or other organizations on topics linked to crime control and public safety, useful to 
understand the socio-political understanding of crime and safety policies. 
 
1 Available at www.ucrdatatool.gov/. 
2 Five interviews and three work meetings with: academicians (University of Memphis, Criminology and Criminal 
Justice); municipal civil servants (MPD; Parks and Neighborhoods); a retired criminologist and former consultant of 
MPD; an activist from the Mid-South Peace and Justice Center; and a lawyer, chair of Memphis Crime Commission. 
3 Thanks to a partnership between the University of Memphis, Department of City and Regional Planning (activities 
coordinated by Laura Saija and Antonio Raciti), and the local Community Development Corporation (CDC). Fieldwork 
consisted in the participation to monthly meetings of the CDC, and further events and activities; and the collaboration in 
the production of a participatory plan for community development. 
 
Smart city and its critiques 
 
Widely used yet poorly defined, over the last decade the term smart city has gained discursive 
dominance amid discussions of the interplay between technology, and urban governance and 
government. Although much has been said and written about it, the smart city still lacks a 
universally accepted definition. In recent years, however, a more or less coherent view on the smart 
city has emerged: its notion is commonly associated with a constellation of technologies—
networked sensors, ubiquitous communications, big data analytics, algorithms—enabling real-time 
management and control of complex urban dynamics (Komninos, 2002; Batty et al., 2012; Manvlle 
et al., 2014; Melgaço & Willis, 2017). Grounded in positive visions of data-driven urban 
omniscience, the epistemological assumption behind smart urbanism is that each city functions, 
ideally at least, as a complex “system of systems”—including transportation, energy, education, 
health care, public safety, and security (cf. IBM, 2011, p. 2; Marvin and Luque-Ayala, 2017). As 
such, cities’ overall performance can be optimized by tackling urban problems in a holistic and 
coordinated fashion through the integrative analysis of geosocial data.  
As a result of the widespread deployment, at the urban scale, of smart technologies, and in view 
of their capacity to collect, store, share and process huge amounts of data, cities have recently 
become ‘testbed territories’ (Halpern et. al, 2013) for new forms of data-driven, algorithmic 
governance—namely, “a technically-mediated means to manage a city”, whose political 
legitimation lies in the belief that algorithm-informed decision-making “ensures rational, logical 
and impartial governance and optimal performance” (Kitchin, 2018, p. 224). Thus, put into 
perspective, the city-scale implementation of smart solutions, including predictive policing, as tools 
to solve otherwise intractable problems can be understood as part of a broader trend towards 
algorithm-based policymaking, and must be framed within the context of the smart city’s global 
discourse and imaginary (White, 2016; Sadowski & Bendor, 2019).  
As its advocates maintain, the rationale underpinning the smart city, and algorithmic governance 
more generally (cf. Coletta & Kitchin, 2017; Danaher et al., 2017), rests upon two partially 
overlapping, mutually reinforcing logics: anticipating uncertain futures as a way to shape today’s 
policy; solving actual and potential urban problems by means of (supposedly) objective, politically-
neutral, technological fixes. Shaped through business reports and promotional materials, the smart 
city’s global imaginary, which “consists of a general but flexible narrative and a common set of 
logics for anticipating future crises” (White, 2016, p. 3), is inherently appealing. Whereas in 
response to impending yet unavoidable “crises” (e.g. mass urbanization), “the smart city seeks to 
prepare for [them] by pre empting [their] anticipated effects on infrastructure and resource 
management” (White 2016, p. 9), in the domain of public safety/security the smart city’s 
anticipatory logics (Anderson, 2010; Amoore, 2013) are pushed to extremes: predictive models 
promise to prevent crime and violence from happening in the first place. 
Critical urban scholarship has shown how multinational private vendors have been “selling 
smartness” to local governments by disseminating narratives of crisis—demographic, ecological, 
financial—and thereby proposing their own technological solutions for securing the present against 
those same crises (Sadowski & Bendor, 2019). In other words, as cities are portrayed both as the 
sites where problems emerge and solutions are to be found, the salvific rhetoric implicit in the smart 
city imaginary, while enabling its global circulation and reach, has served as discursive device to 
justify neoliberal strategies of urban entrepreneurialism (Hollands, 2008; Rossi, 2016) and 
technocratic configurations of urban governance (Raco & Imrie, 2000; Kitchin, 2014; Greenfield, 
2013). The smart city, in this sense, can be understood as the ultimate attempt at deploying 
technology as ideology (cf. León & Rosen, 2020), an ideology that is typical of the neoliberal(izing) 
city: corporatization of urban services (Hollands, 2008; Kitchin, 2014; Vanolo, 2014); dismantling 
of welfare programs; and over-securitization of public space (Armao, 2013; Hoover, 2013). 
Complementary to such criticisms are concerns, which we will discuss further in the next section, 
associated with the “black box” opacity of algorithms (Shuppli, 2014; Pasquale, 2015; AI Now 
Institute, 2019; Amoore & Raley, 2017), especially considering the troublesome involvement of 
private companies in their design and implementation, and as they often conceal, if not amplify, 
societal biases embedded in their inner workings. 
 
Predictive policing and its critiques 
 
Predictive policing is the ultimate, algorithm-based version of an evidence-informed approach to 
policing based on the systemic use of statistical methods for crime mapping and analysis. The 
genealogy of predictive policing can be traced back to the 1960s (Hinton, 2016, p. 91), with 
experiences in Philadelphia, Cleveland and California—the latter promoted by the RAND 
corporation, a major player in this field (see Perry, McInnis, Price, Smith & Hollywood, 2013; Hunt 
et al., 2014). An important moment for the popularization of crime mapping techniques is to be 
found in New York City Police Department’s CompStats (short for Compare Statistics), launched in 
1994. Though CompStats was above all designed to be an accountability instrument, useful to hold 
precinct commanders to account for crime spikes, in fact, crime statistics were discussed on weekly 
meetings where georeferenced patterns and regularities were identified, high-crime areas (also 
known as “hot-spots”)4 mapped, and a “rational distribution” of patrols sought (Jefferson, 2018, p. 
1254). The innovative aspect of predictive policing is the combined use of GIS, software 
technology provided by hi-tech corporations, and algorithmic analytics to support (near) real-time 
crime data analysis, mapping and visualization (see, e.g., Fittered, Nelson & Nathoo, 2015). Blue 
CRUSH and PredPol—this latter developed by criminologist P. Jeffrey Brantingham and 
mathematician and computer scientist George Mohler, and launched in Los Angeles—pioneered the 
development of predictive policing. PredPol has become the most popular technology, used by 
some 60 police departments all around the U.S.A. (Hvistendahl, 2016). Another, less common 
 
4 Hot-spot policing is a grounded on the evidence of concentration of crimes, in U.S. cities, in “very small places”: “the 
appeal of focusing limited resources on a small number of high-activity crime places is straightforward. If we can 
prevent crime at these hot spots, then we might be able to reduce total crime” (Braga, Papachristos & Hureau., 2014). 
See Hope (2017) for a compelling critique of the very roots of this understanding. 
version of predictive policing assesses risks associated with individuals considered to be likely to be 
involved in criminal activity—see, e.g., the Strategic Subject List created in 2013 by the Chicago 
Police Department (Saunders, Hunt & Hollywood, 2016) and the system developed by Palantir in 
New Orleans (Winston, 2018). 
From a theoretical perspective, predictive policing builds on the “criminologies of everyday life” 
(see Garland, 2001, p. 127ff) and situational crime prevention (see Brantingham, Brantingham & 
Taylor, 2005), themselves grounded on rational choice theories of crime.5 The specificity of 
predictive policing is that it adopts an anticipatory logic to disrupting criminal activity thus 
understood, coherently with the recent emergence of preemption as a mode of governing in the field 
of security and beyond (Anderson 2010; Amoore 2013). More specifically, two excerpts from 
testimonials on PredPol’s website show the centrality of the two-fold rationale of the smart city’s 
anticipatory discourse for predictive policing: 
 
The theory is that you prevent them from committing the crime to begin with… Burglars and thieves 
work in a mathematical way, whether they know it or not. 
 
We probably disrupted criminal activity eight to 10 times a week…6 
 
First, crime is a matter of mathematics, hence it can be addressed through technological means, 
as long as one is able to reverse-engineer its working from its spatio-temporal distribution. And, 
 
5 Theories such as routine activity (Brunet, 2002) or opportunity (Felson & Clarke, 1998), which explain crime as the 
result of the encounter of a rationally motivated criminal with a potential victim in a favourable time/space context. If 
truth be said, Brantingham (2013; see also Maguire, 2018) has theorized a more complex rationale of car thieves, who 
would follow sub-optimal choices guided by evolutionary patterns. But, first, other crimes, for instance burglary, have 
long been discussed by positivist criminology as following rational choice patterns; and, second, the idea of police 
patrols as preventative means nonetheless builds on a paradigm of situational prevention (see also the “Crime Prediction 
and Prevention” page on IBM’s website: www.ibm.com/industries/government/public-safety/crime-prediction-
prevention; accessed 15 November 2019). 
6 Our emphases. Modesto Police Chief Galen Carroll and LAPD Foothill Division Captain Sean Malinowski, 
quoted in www.predpol.com/testimonials/ (accessed 15 November 2019). See also the case for predictive policing made 
by Los Angeles chief of detectives in three arguments (Beck, 2009): first, predictive policing improves efficiency by 
reducing costs; second, evidence-based policing makes a neutral and technical issue of crime; and, third, by emulating 
forecasts used in distribution and retail operations, it allows public policy to be managed like a business. 
second, once reverse-engineering is completed, one can predict future crimes from past ones and 
hence disrupt them in the present. By using technology intensively, and by putting governments in 
partnership with private companies, predictive policing offers a future-oriented, “technically 
neutral” solution to crime and violence, the ultimate intractable problem of urban imagination—
particularly in U.S. cities, where they are deeply entrenched with socio-economic relationships, and 
racial and class strife (Friedson & Sharkey, 2015; Tulumello, 2018a). 
Against this backdrop, two questions arise. First, is predictive policing a (future-oriented) 
“solution”? (That is, does it reduce crime in the first place?) And, second, is it a “neutral” solution 
that neutralizes the complex politics of crime control? 
With regard to the first issue, predictive policing has been advertised as a successful experience 
and a recent review (Meijer & Wessels, 2019) found two works that had backed up those claims: 
one carried out by the developers of PredPol (Mohler et al., 2015) and another one on NYPD’s 
Domain Awareness System, carried out by members of the same department (Levine et al., 2017). 
In short, these works have been produced by practitioners invested in the development of the 
programs they evaluated—see Benbouzid (2015) on the epistemological problems of connecting 
crime science to the commercialization of crime software. Indeed, independent research has 
produced quite different findings. Two RAND Corporation’s evaluations—of the predictive 
policing program used by the Shreveport Police Department (Lousiana) and of Chicago’s Strategic 
Subject List—found no significant effect in reducing crime (Hunt et al., 2014; Saunders et al., 
2016). In summary, empirical evidence of the effectiveness of predictive policing is basically 
missing (Moses & Chan, 2018; Meijer & Wessels, 2019). Theoretically, it is reasonable to believe 
that predictive policing may have some impact on property crimes, where the rational decision of 
the offender plays a role, but definitely not on violent crimes (see Ferguson, 2012). 
With regards to the second issue, advocates of predictive policing have been arguing that it is a 
neutral and bias-free instrument: 
 
PredPol uses only three data points in making predictions: past type of crime, place of crime and time 
of crime. It uses no personal information about individuals or groups of individuals, eliminating any 
personal liberties and profiling concerns.7 
 
The idea that the use of crime data would prevent bias or profiling is fascinating, but it has been 
proven false by research on the relation between scientific evidence and racialization of policing—
see, among others, Hinton (2016, pp. 17-26) on scientific data in the history of mass incarceration 
and Jefferson (2016; 2018a) on racialization of CompStats. Recently, academia and the press have 
put forward four main critical arguments (see Ferguson, 2012; Vlahos, 2012; Stroud, 2014; 
Townsend, 2015; Luum & Isaac, 2016; O’Neil, 2016; Shapiro, 2017; Jefferson, 2018b; Moses & 
Chan, 2018; Munn, 2018; Winston, 2018). First, the fact that algorithms are systematically 
protected by copyrights eliminates accountability, transparency, and the possibility to actually 
verify claims about neutrality and objectiveness—moreover, police departments throughout the 
U.S.A. have tended to implement predictive policing secretly, in some cases even without the 
knowledge of city governments (for instance in New Orleans). Second, it is nonetheless quite 
obvious that the collection of massive data about crime raises problems of privacy and data 
handling, particularly when data are shared among governmental agencies and corporations. Third, 
predictive policing is heavily shaped by the data it uses; and in contexts where enforcement, hence 
reporting, is influenced by class and racial biases (the U.S.A. being the quintessentially problematic 
case), it cannot help but reproduce those same biases through its algorithmic elaboration.8 This 
tends to worsen when police decides to focus, and predictive policing incorporates data about, 
misdemeanors and nuisance crimes, which are not directly connected to individual safety and tend 
to be “endemic” to impoverished neighborhoods (O’Neil, 2016, p. 86). Hence, last, the scientific 
elaboration over geographic concentration of reported crimes, itself influenced by police biases, 
 
7 Our emphasis. Quoted by Lum and Isaac (2016, p. 18) and originally found on PredPol website 
(www.predpol.com/about/), but not available at the time of writing. 
8 Aradau and Blanke suggest that, “through the featurization of time and space, PredPol has, for example, pre-emptively 
dis-activated accusations of discrimination” (2017, p. 386). This argument is theoretically intriguing, but is nonetheless 
problematized by the fact that, as shown by the literature here reviewed, discrimination has been proven virtually every 
time predictive policing has been empirically scrutinized. 
ends up furthering processes of territorial stigmatization.9 Indeed, a leaked PredPol report 
demonstrates that the company considers predictive policing a contemporary form of “broken 
windows”, a deeply racialized approach to policing (e.g. Jefferson, 2016; Camp & Heatherton, 
2016).10 As recently summarized by Shapiro (2019: abstract): “the ambiguities and contradictions 
of the patrol are not resolved through algorithmic remediation. Instead, they lead to new 
indeterminacies, trade-offs, and experimentations based on unfalsifiable claims.” 
Against this backdrop, in what follows we will set out the first critical, in-depth study of Blue 
CRUSH, to further the critique of predictive policing and bridge it to the critique of the discourse of 
the smart city. 
 
Predictive policing in Memphis: Blue CRUSH 
 
Blue CRUSH was developed in Memphis (Tennessee; 650,000 inhabitants), central city of one 
of the most unequal and poor metros in the U.S.A. (EIG, 2018), undergoing processes of turbulent 
change. In line with broader trends of the U.S. South, Memphis has been experiencing with 
globalization and neoliberalization (Rushing, 2009; Lloyd, 2012; Tulumello, 2018a), in a rush to 
attract corporate investment and creative classes, and compete with other emerging cities. 
Regarding the participation of the city in smart city trends, Memphis stays in a paradoxical position 
as an early adopter and, together, a laggard. As already mentioned, Blue CRUSH, whose 
development started in 2006, pioneered predictive policing and was one of the earliest attempts by 
IBM in this field. However, the explicit adoption of a grammar of “smart city” was never part of 
Blue CRUSH, and only recently have city leaders been interested in catching up on global trends of 
smart city development: in 2016, Memphis applied to the federally funded Smart City Challenge for 
 
9 If truth be said, one study authored by the developers of PredPol found no evidence of racial bias in arrests made 
through predictive policing in Los Angeles (Brantingham, Valasik & Mohler, 2018). 
10 The report is available at www.muckrock.com/foi/elgin-7770/foia-elgin-police-dept-predpol-documents-51858/#file-
190432 (accessed 15 November 2019) and was made public by Lucy Parsons Labs, a Chicago-based project that 
focuses on the intersection between digital rights and “on-the-streets issues” (see https://lucyparsonslabs.com/). 
integrated smart transportation system (see Office of the Mayor, no date); and in 2017 a partnership 
between the city and the University of Memphis (sponsored by Memphis-based logistic giant 
FedEx) launched a research cluster on smart cities—including attempts at predicting crimes using 
Twitter data (Venugopal, 2018).11 But the biggest investment in this field made by the city has been 
in partnership with IBM itself, plus Oracle, to develop smart solutions for human resources 
management and services such as the emergency call system (Post, 2018). In this sense, Memphis is 
a perfect example of the way predictive policing has been one of the drivers of those logics widely 
understood to be typical of the smart city. 
The cooperation between the city and IBM started precisely with Blue CRUSH. Launched as a 
pilot in 2006 and implemented city-wide in 2007, Blue CRUSH is a typical example of GIS based 
predictive policing program that makes use of real time data from reports by police officers and 
intelligent CCTV with plate recognition software. 
 
Blue CRUSH is data-driven policing. This is a trademark, a name that was put on data-driven policing. 
[…] Data-driven policing [is] putting resources in the right place, at the right time, looking for very 
specific things (high-ranking MPD official, interview). 
 
Patterns are going to be good at forecasting where you’re gonna have your crime problems. If you put 
officers in the right place, at the right time, on the right day, things are gonna happen (former MPD 
consultant, interview). 
 
Investment into Blue CRUSH peaked in 2011. Afterwards, because of the shrinking number of 
sworn officers (mostly due to attrition) and cuts in overtime funding,12 predictive policing had to be 
reduced in scope. In the remainder of this section, we will question the effectiveness of Blue 
 
11 See www.memphis.edu/fedex/SmartCities/ (accessed 15 November 2019). 
12 Blue CRUSH was heavily reliant on overtimes, as we heard from two interviewees (former MPD consultant and 
activist of Mid-South Peace and Justice Center) and a document made available by a local councilman confirmed 
(www.memphistn.gov/Portals/0/pdf_forms/bluecrushanalysis1.pdf; available through Internet Archive, 
https://archive.org/). 




The full implementation of Blue CRUSH between 2007 and 2011 was accompanied by 
triumphalist discourses. A high-ranking MPD official, a former MPD consultant and the former 
chief of Memphis Crime Commission, interviewed, declared that Blue CRUSH had brought crime 
down. Blue CRUSH was awarded locally (in 2010 by newspaper Commercial Appeal) and 
internationally—the MPD was the recipient of the 2009 award for Excellence in Law Enforcement 
Communications and Interoperability (Large Cities) by the International Association of Chiefs of 
Police.  
On what grounds was Blue CRUSH considered successful? In 2012, the MPD announced a 26% 
drop of serious property and violent crimes in comparison with 2006 (Vlahos, 2012)—according to 
another source, MPD reported in 2010 a 31% reduction of serious crime and 15.4% reduction of 
violent crime (Smith, 2010). Almost all the few academic or journalistic works on Blue CRUSH 
have reported those data, providing no empirical discussion (Hickman, 2013; Perry et al., 2013, pp. 
67-69; Dinale, 2014, p. 28; Djukanovic, Harrison & Randjelovic, 2015, p. 103). 
An exception is Vlahos (2012), who noticed that comparing crime rates with 2006, a year 
characterized by a crime peak, could prove misleading and suggested comparing the average of 
2001-2005 with 2006-2010—comparing longer periods of time, by reducing the effect of sudden 
yearly oscillations, is a more sensible choice than comparing single years. Vlahos found, for 2006-
2010, a slight drop of total crime (-8%) but a rise of violent crime (+14%). However, we suggest 
that including 2006 (the year of the crime peak) in the period of implementation may be misleading 
in turn because Blue CRUSH was not yet deployed city-wide. 
We have therefore compared the period 2002-2006 (hereafter “before”) with 2007-2011 
(“during”)—by attributing the crime peak of 2006 to “before”, we are conceding Blue CRUSH the 
best possible case for comparison. We broke down the analysis for the most important categories 
available in the FBI UCR. We did not consider homicide and rape (and hence the total volume of 
violent crimes), whose (reported) numbers are too small to create geographically significant 
patterns—the creators of Blue CRUSH indeed claimed they were not expecting the program to 
affect those crimes (former MPD consultant and high-ranking MPD official, interviews). We also 
verified the claim by MPD that, after 2011, once the number of sworn officials started to shrink and 
Blue CRUSH was scaled down, crime went up again (high-raking MPD official, interview). For this 
purpose, we compared the period “during” with 2012-2014 (“after”; 2014 is the most recent 
comparable year).13 The results are in Table 1. Let us remind that reported crime rates are 
influenced heavily by police priorities, the likeliness that victims report crimes and even reporting 
systems—see the difference between UCR and MPD data (Table 1; Figures 1 and 2). Our goal is 
therefore not seeking “the truth” about crime trends in Memphis, but rather questioning whether 
official data support policymakers’ claims. 
The comparison of 2006 with 2011 confirms the drop of crime reported by policymakers. 
However, the comparison of “before” with “during” shows that, during the years of full 
implementation of Blue CRUSH, some crimes were reported to be dropping. Property crimes and 
robbery went down—robbery is categorized as a violent crime, but it can be associated to property 
crime because the role of the rational decision plays a more important role than in other violent 
crimes. Aggravated assault, the most frequent and problematic violent crime in the city (as we heard 
in all interviews), on the contrary, grew quite significantly (+13.6%)—“we have very little if any 
effect, for example, on aggravated assault”, admitted a former MPD consultant, interviewed. 
When we compare “during” with “after”, we see property crime and robbery still going down, 
and aggravated assault still growing: in plain contradiction with MPD allegations, UCR data show 
that trends did not change after the reduction of Blue CRUSH. Indeed, the only crime that went up 
after the scaling down of Blue CRUSH, aggravated assault, is the one that we expected to be 
 
13 More recent UCR crime data are provided in different formats and may be not comparable. 
influenced the least. Data provided by MPD14 show that the total volume of reported violent crime 
(therefore, above all, robberies and aggravated assaults), despite seasonal variations, kept 
decreasing (Figure 1) and the volume of solved crimes decreased too. A simple correlation of the 
monthly number of sworn officers with the number of violent crimes shows a dispersed graph (the 
dispersion is above all due to seasonal variations), with a very slight positive correlation (Figure 2). 
Of course, we are not suggesting that less sworn officers should be associated causally with 
decreasing crime, but probably that less crimes are reported with less active officers; and of course 
less crimes are solved by less officers. At any rate, there is no ground to MPD’s claim that crime 
“went up” once Blue CRUSH was scaled down. 
 
TABLE 1, FIGURES 1 and 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
These data make more sense once they are put into context and considered in the long run.15 In 
the long term, almost all property crimes, with the exception of larceny theft, have been decreasing 
in Memphis, in line with the national “crime drop” (Baumer & Wolff, 2014). Robbery is in line 
with property crime, having dropped since the mid-1990s—a peak happened in 2005 and 2006, 
followed by a decline back to pre-2005 levels. This seems to suggest that, yearly variations 
notwithstanding, Blue CRUSH accompanied the longstanding trend of reduction of property crimes 
and robbery. Aggravated assault had been growing since the 1980s and stabilized, though with 
oscillations, since 2006, right before Blue CRUSH was implemented city-wide. Crucially, around 
half of the crimes reported as aggravated assault are due to domestic violence, which happens where 
Blue CRUSH has no role to play (as many of our interviewees admitted). All in all, official crime 
data do not offer any empirical ground to conclude that Blue CRUSH may have had any impact on 
crime. 
 
14 Monthly number of violent crimes, violent crimes solved and sworn officers, January 2012 to June 2016. MIMEO 
(we can share the files upon request). We are grateful to MPD’s Office of Public Relations. 
15 The following claims are based on our elaboration of UCR data, available since 1985, and, again, should be 
considered with a pinch of salt, like all reported crime data (for some series of data, see Tulumello, 2018b). 
 
On territorial discrimination, transparency and privatization 
 
Similarly to other predictive policing programs, Blue CRUSH raised concerns about the way 
increased police presence associated with the program was felt in minority-majority neighborhoods. 
The Mid-South Peace and Justice Center16 has denounced that the deployment of preventative 
patrols in certain areas, together with the concurrent dissolution of pre-existing proximity policing17 
units (cf. Tulumello, 2018b), resulted in “harassment” of, and feelings of fear and distress by, many 
communities, and especially Black and Brown youths and young adults (Mid-South Peace and 
Justice Center, 2013). An activist, interviewed, considered that, in African-American communities, 
“now everyone’s being treated like a criminal;” and defined Blue CRUSH a process of 
“occupation” (see also Garner, 2019). Indeed, also a former chief of the Crime Commission and 
advocate of Blue CRUSH, interviewed, argued that “you’ve got to really saturate an area to 
improve... to prevent bad stuff from happen” (our emphasis). 
While Blue CRUSH policing is concentrated in minority-majority neighborhoods, Blue CRUSH 
cameras “leave many neighborhoods in the dark” (Poe, 2016), being concentrated in affluent and 
touristic areas. Moreover, the city has encouraged neighborhoods to fundraise to install cameras18—
considering that each camera costs around 15 thousand dollars, this is increasing the disparities 
among wealthy and poor neighborhoods (cf. Corbet, 2016). In Memphis, the geography of 
predictive policing, and of the security apparatus in general, seems to have a double nature: 
“reassuring the rich, policing the (racialized) poor” (Tulumello, 2018a, p. 193). 
Blue CRUSH shows further problems concerning transparency and privatization. First, in 2012, 
 
16 An organization with the mission to “engage, organize and mobilize communities to realize social justice through 
nonviolent action” since 1982. See https://midsouthpeace.org/about-us/history/ (accessed 15 November 2019). 
17 We do not use the term “community policing” because in Memphis, and in the U.S.A. more generally, the ideal type 
of the latter—which is characterized by co-decisional practices—has never been achieved, and the label has being used 
to refer to proximity practices such as aggressive order maintenance and nuisance abatement (Goetz & Mitchell, 2003; 
Tulumello, 2018b). 
18 Mayor’s Weekly Digest Bulletin, 17 June 2016. 
following the change of the police chief, a local newspaper reported an internal governmental audit 
that had discovered 79,000 police memos not included in official statistics over the previous five 
years, those of full implementation of predictive policing (Maki, 2012; The Commercial Appeal, 
2012), when, Blue CRUSH advocates argue, the program was being a success (see above).19 
Second, allegations of conflict of interest and revolving doors have been made with regard to the 
contract awarded to local corporation SkyCop for intelligent CCTVs (Perrusquia, 2010)—the 
current vice-president of sales at SkyCop was among those in the MPD who assembled the bid and 
selected the winner.20 Third, Blue CRUSH is a trademark, a simple fact that shows the existence of 
important economic interests around this theoretically public program21 and makes it almost 
impossible to scrutinize in-depth its technological rationale. 
 
Placing predictive policing in context: discussion 
 
Predictive policing, quite obviously, does not happen in a vacuum, especially in institutional 
contexts, like the U.S.A., where the competence for policing is coupled, at the local level, with that 
for urban and social policy (see Tulumello, 2018b). Investing in policing and deciding what types of 
policing are to be prioritized are political decisions driven, on the one hand, by public pressures for 
“doing something about crime”, and, on the other, the hegemony of neoliberal ideas about, and 
trends for, public policy (idem; Garland, 2001). Predictive policing, in resonance with smart city 
discourses, is based on arguments of efficiency and technological-intensive neutrality. And yet, our 
empirical discussion of Blue CRUSH adds to the literature that problematizes those very arguments. 
 
19 The Commercial Appeal did not follow up on the topic and our requests of information were never answered by the 
newspaper. 
20 Ken Shackleford is listed in the page “About SkyCop” of the company website at the time of writing: 
www.skycopinc.com/index.php?p=about. In a document (without data) available on SkyCop website, Shackleford is 
quoted as MPD Lieutenant, explaining the decision to buy SkyCop equipment: 
www.skycopinc.com/assets/sitemedia/PDFs/SkyCopMemphis.pdf  (accessed 15 November 2019). Our requests of 
interview were not answered by SkyCop. 
21 In 2008, a firm of lawyers, representing the City of Memphis and MPD, sent a takedown notice to an online shop, for 
the selling of t-shirts and bumper stickers with Blue CRUSH logo. See 
www.citizen.org/documents/MemphisTakedownNoticetoZazzle.pdf (accessed 15 November 2019). 
If predictive policing does not prevent crime and does not neutralize the politics therein, what is its 
role in the urban realm? By widening the discussion of Blue CRUSH to the political and 
institutional context of Memphis, we can provide some answers to this question—in what follows, 
we will focus on how predictive policing contributes to restructuring urban policy and police job. 
To begin with, let us note that there was not much public debate at the time when Blue CRUSH 
was launched. According to a high-ranking MPD official, interviewed, the decision to launch Blue 
CRUSH was the police department’s. 
 
There isn’t a lot of public discussion about [Blue CRUSH]. It’s like the public has not been given a lot 
of thought for the most part. Why that is? I guess we could probably speculate, I think some of it 
because it is technical, some of it because... at a certain level the public is actually comfortable with it 
as the technology has sort of expanded (former MPD consultant, interview). 
 
 Though Blue CRUSH was developed independently by MPD, the city government was happy to 
follow through, providing the budgetary resources to hire more sworn officials (which grew from 
2,000 in 2006 to 2,450 in 2011) and pay the necessary overtimes. There was a generalized 
consensus around the implementation of predictive policing in Memphis, which is explicable in 
light of this city’s particularly high crime rates. Analyses of media and political discourses show 
how crime is an extremely hot topic in Memphis and how generalized is, among policymakers and 
most citizens alike, the idea that policing is the most appropriate means to prevent it (Tulumello, 
2018a; 2018b). Indeed, during our participant observation in Klondike-Smokey City, in the monthly 
partnership meetings convened by the local Community Development Corporation, crime and 
violence were systematically the main topics of discussion; and one of the recurring arguments was 
the possibility to install Blue CRUSH cameras in the school campus, where a shooting took place in 
November 2015. Against this background, the creators of Blue CRUSH were able to convince 
policymakers that “the chaos can be controlled with information and technology” (Rosin, 2008). 
Predictive policing was not object of political discussion, but it had policy impacts, as evident 
once we consider it against the background of the long-term austerity characterizing urban policy in 
the U.S.A. (Golsmith & Blakely, 2010[1992]). Austerity, in Memphis and many other U.S. cities, is 
at the same time low-intensity and permanent (Tulumello, 2018a; Saija, Santo & Raciti, 2020): 
rather then characterized by sudden cuts to public expenditure as a response to economic crises, 
U.S.-style local austerity is more often a cycle through which public action is restructured, by 
shifting resources from social programs toward other policy areas; and from the public sphere 
toward circuits of accumulation. Since Blue CRUSH was launched in 2006, the budget of the City 
of Memphis has remained overall stable; but while funding for the MPD has been growing steadily, 
virtually all other policy areas have been cut (Tulumello, 2018a, pp. 179-180). MPD budget also 
increased in the years when the number of officers was going down, as the City of Memphis 
allocated massive resources to technological equipment, including a “$3 million state-of-the-art 
crime monitoring and analysis hub” (the Real Time Crime Center purchased from IBM),22 body-
wear cameras, in-car viewing systems and a radio system (high-ranking MPD official, interview). 
When questioned on the reasons for this budget growth, and on the role of technology in the 
process, a high-ranking MPD official argued that, on the one hand, technology had helped 
“offset[ting the] reduction in personnel;” but, on the other, “it is not that we are reducing the force 
to bring in more technology.” Part of the investment in technology is “kinda mandated, we have to 
update things that are going off their service life.” But, overall, technology is purchased “because 
smart policing is the way the law enforcement kinda does business now.” 
Technology is “mandated”—much like smartness has become a mandate (Halpern, Mitchell & 
Geoghehan, 2017)—, it is the way “business” goes on. And, in the field of crime control, it is a 
pivotal component of the transference of resources from all sectors of public policy toward policing; 
and from the latter toward private actors: an activist of the Mid-South Peace and Justice Center 
reminded us in an interview that “there’s a lot of people who make a lot of money off of building 
the infrastructure around the science of data.” Beyond reminding us of the problems interlinked 
 
22 See www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/32169.wss#release (accessed 15 November 2019). 
with the very nature of public-private-partnerships crucial to the smart city, the case of predictive 
policing is paradigmatic of the power that the intersection of discourses about crime control and 
smart governance has in deepening austerity and neoliberalization of public policy (cf. Pollio, 
2018). 
At the same time, predictive policing restructures police priorities. Before the launch of Blue 
CRUSH, Co-Acts proximity units were deployed throughout the city. During participant observation 
in Klondike-Smokey City, the elderly residents we met remembered the Co-Acts unit as an important 
presence, in terms of creation of trustworthy relationships between police and local community. With 
the full deployment of Blue CRUSH, with its heavy request in terms of manpower, Co-Acts units 
were discontinued and replaced by the pilot program Community Outreach (active in three precincts), 
whose objective is to “communicate to community in general that you’re changing the strategy in 
general and, then, what the results [are] on an ongoing basis” (former MPD consultant, interview). 
Community Outreach, which included the organization of town-hall meetings, was intended to reduce 
the risk of “pushbacks” (idem). It is quite intuitive to infer that the downscaling of proximity policing 
may have played a role in the perception of Blue CRUSH as “occupation” (see previous section). 
More generally, predictive policing, because of its quintessentially anticipatory logics, transforms 
the nature of proactive police work qualitatively. In models such as proximity and community 
policing, the preventive role of police is considered to stem above all from the engagement of police 
in fields other from policing, like social work, mental health care and community building (see Goetz 
& Mitchell, 2003; Tulumello, 2018b). Within predictive policing, instead, the ambition is preventing 
by deploying police patrols to anticipate specific threats forecasted by technological, intensive 
surveillance. As evidence of the effectiveness of the latter approach is missing, then, the trend toward 
predictive policing may also result in a worsening of police work more generally: as we saw, the 
investment in Blue CRUSH brought to a reduced attention by MPD into building relationships of 
trust with communities, which are themselves crucial to investigating crime. In other words, by 
following delusional dreams of situational prevention, not only does predictive policing makes social 
prevention harder; but at the same time it may even jeopardize good police work, that is, to solve 
crime in the first place.23 
 
Conclusion: beyond (smart) solutions 
 
These tech advances are sold as morally superior because they purport to rise above human bias, even 
though they could not exist without data produced through histories of exclusion and discrimination 
(Benjamin, 2019, p. 15). 
 
We repeatedly see reform agendas framed in terms of beautification and optimization which tend to 
distract us from what they ultimately are, namely the expression of underlying political and social 
transformations, and the reproduction of the same problems in new guises (Angelo & Vormann, 2018, 
p. 16). 
 
The empirical discussion of Blue CRUSH allowed us to further the deconstruction of the idea 
that predictive policing is a “solution” to crime and violence. If we cannot understand Blue CRUSH 
as an instrument to reduce crime, what is predictive policing about in the first place? Let us come 
back to issues long known to critical criminology. Predictive policing can hardly be much better 
than the data it is fed with, data which have always been problematic to begin with. This is to say, if 
police data describe police priorities more accurately than crime (Sutherland & Cressey, 1978, p. 
30), how could the algorithmic, real-time analysis of those very data do anything else than 
reproducing the priorities police has already set for itself? At the same time as it projects an aura of 
scientific truth and neutrality, predictive policing above all reproduces the ways crime and 
criminalization, far from being neutral concepts, are shaped by power relationships, represent the 
purview and interests of dominant groups (see Gusfield, 1981; Hulsman, 1986; Reiner, 2016)—an 
 
23 This is a topic that deserves further specific empirical investigation. For an early example, see Sanhu and Fussey’s 
ethnography (2020) in police agencies that make use of predictive policing in the UK, which has emphasized a tendency 
by police officers to be reluctant in following software’s instructions. 
argument made by Ruha Benjamin (2019; see quotation above) with regard to technology and racial 
injustice more widely. 
We suggested, then, the need to open up to other dimensions, showing the role of predictive 
policing in shaping urban policy, and police job as well, in Memphis, a city under long-term 
austerity rule. By doing so, we have shown that predictive policing contributes to the expansion of 
policing at the expenses of urban policy, at the same time as it disrupts police work. In other words, 
predictive policing pushes in the same direction—more police, more aggressive policing, and less 
social prevention and intervention—of many decades of neoliberalization in U.S. cities (cf. 
Tulumello, 2018a). 
Our goal was to discuss a policy instrument that has been part and parcel of the emergence and 
success of the smart city discourse: the problems we have emphasized in the field of predictive 
policing may not be generalized to the entire field of the smart city; and yet, our case study gives 
empirical evidence to Angelo and Vormann’s hypothesis (2018; see quotation above) that, once 
explored as the irruption of a long wave of urban reform and historicized, the smart city argument 
tastes quite like the proverbial old wine in new bottles. 
This is an argument that has been recently problematized by Mark Maguire in relation, precisely, 
to predictive policing. For Maguire, by “simply engag[ing] with new policing and security 
technologies in terms of their possible nefarious uses, we will lose the possibility of genuine 
critique, by which I mean an understanding of the core assumptions from which those technologies 
emerged and the alternatives available at root” (2018, p. 154). Maguire starts his essay by reflecting 
on the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson (Missouri) by a police officer, asking us to think 
beyond the problem of the encounter of the Black body with the agent of his death, and consider the 
nature of that encounter—and possible alternatives—to begin with. Maguire then asks: “even if we 
distrust technological governance and despise the advocates of predictive solutions, we must ask 
ourselves this: what if the robbery in the Ferguson Market and Liquor had never occurred?” (idem: 
ibidem). Blue CRUSH may well had flagged the “Ferguson Market and Liquor” store at the 
particular moment when Michael Brown was to be there—once again, that would not really be any 
news, as liquor stores at night have been considered “hot spots” in the U.S.A. long before predictive 
policing was invented. As we know by now, it is unlikely that this would had reduced the 
possibility of the encounter—no available evidence backs the idea that Blue CRUSH and predictive 
policing do reduce the risk of crime to happen. In other words, Michael Brown and the police 
officer may had encountered there even if the latter had been deployed by an algorithm rather than 
following an emergency call. Would had this been enough for that particular encounter to happen 
differently? In fact, this may even had increased the suspicion of the officer while stepping into an 
area defined by the software to be at high risk (cf. Benjamin, 2019, pp.88-89). 
Still, it seems to us that Maguire’s proposal for a different critique of predictive policing is still 
fruitful for reflecting on the smart city, but once applied to the promises of the latter as an ideal 
construct rather than to the “actually-existing smart city”. Indeed, it is in their promises, in their 
“mundanely predictable hopes” (Datta & Odenaal, 2019, p. 392), that we find the power of 
predictive policing and smart city. The promise is the depiction of an ideal—the safe/smart city—
against which the messy present is projected as problematic and in need to be aggressively 
enforced. Paraphrasing Pavoni and Tulumello’s discussion (2020) of the way the (neoliberal) 
promise to “secure” the city shapes the form of violence that we call urban violence, our discussion 
shows that it is because of the smart city’s promise to solve all urban problems that (instruments 
like) predictive policing end(s) up disrupting urban policy by contributing to progressively replace 
it with policing lato sensu—aspects that may be less visible when theoretically reflecting on the 
discourse of the smart city, but that surface when connecting the empirical investigation of specific 
technologies to the political economy of urban government in times of late neoliberalism. 
And yet, it is precisely here that the potential for a transformative critique can be found. The 
deconstruction of predictive policing, the ultimate attempt at “solving” urban problems—one that 
was envisioned by sci-fi well before its technological actualization24—, ultimately opens up to the 
 
24 Quite interestingly, some of the most poignant critiques of predictive technologies have been made by former data 
scientists become novelists (cf. Lepore, 2020). 
understanding that the problem is the “problem” in the first place; that only by giving up the illusion 
that urban problems can be “solved” merely by means of technical and technological management 
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Table 1. Variations of main crime categories (rates), “before”, “during” and “after” the full 
implementation of Blue CRUSH. Source: own elaboration of data FBI UCR. 







2006 780.4 1125.2 2417.2 4962.0 989.1 
2011 472.3 1032.3 2030.6 3932.3 526.1 
Δ 2006-2011 -39.5 -8.3 -16.0 -20.8 -46.8 
Average “before” 
(2002-2006) 
662.9 959.1 2410.4 4766.3 1207.3 
Average “during” 
(2007-2011) 
606.6 1089.1 2138.7 4397.1 699.3 
Δ 
“before”/“during” 
-8.5 +13.6 -11.3 -7.7 -42.1 
Average ‘after’ 
(2012-2014) 
497.5 1128.0 1821.3 3863.8 438.6 
Δ 
“during”/“after” 
-18.0 +3.6 -14.8 -12.1 -37.3 
 
  





Figure 2. Violent crimes reported and sworn officers, monthly, scatterplot. Our elaboration on data MPD 
[MIMEO]. 
 
 
